Points And Authorities Template PDF Details

Points and Authorities Template Form is a document used in legal proceedings to provide an overview of the parties involved, the legal arguments, and the facts of the case. The template format is standardized for ease of use, and can be modified to fit specific cases. Lawyers and judges rely on Points and Authorities templates to quickly assess the strengths and weaknesses of a case. When preparing for court, it is important to have all your documents organized and up-to-date. A Points and Authorities template can help you do just that. This document provides an outline of the parties involved, the relevant law, and the facts of the case.

If you would like look at some specific details related to the file you are likely to use, here is the specifics you should study before completing the points and authorities template.

QuestionAnswer
Form NamePoints And Authorities Template
Form Length16 pages
Fillable?No
Fillable fields0
Avg. time to fill out4 min
Other namespoints and authorities format, memorandum of points authorities in rutter group, memorandum of points and authorities, memorandum of points and authorities family law california

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1Terry Gross (103878) Adam C. Belsky (147800)

2GROSS & BELSKY LLP

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 1040

3San Francisco, California 94111

 

Telephone: (415) 544-0200

 

 

 

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Attorneys for Plaintiff

 

 

 

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ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON

 

 

 

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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UNLIMITED JURISDICTION

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ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON,

) Case No. __________

 

 

 

 

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Plaintiff,

) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

 

 

 

 

) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

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) PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE APPLICATION

 

 

 

v.

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FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

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) ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

 

 

 

 

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RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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LAWRENCE SCHILLER, ROBERT

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KARDASHIAN, PROJECT 95

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PRODUCTIONS, INC., and DOES 1-40,

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Date:

August 15, 2000

 

 

 

 

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Time:

8:30 a.m.

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Defendants.

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Dept.: 85/86

 

 

 

 

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

INTRODUCTION

2It is a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence that clients may speak to their attorneys in

3complete confidence, and that the work of their attorneys shall similarly be protected from disclosure.

4This principle obviously applies equally for all criminal defendants, popular or unpopular, rich or poor,

5famous or obscure. There is no media exception to an attorney’s ethical duties of loyalty and

6confidentiality to his client. It is also a basic principle of American law to enforce agreements

7prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information. Here, however, the temptation of fame and

8fortune blinded one of O.J. Simpson’s attorneys, Robert Kardashian, and an author, Lawrence Schiller,

9who saw the opportunityofa bestseller beckoning. They conspired to insinuate Schiller into Simpson’s

10confidence and for Kardashian to make surreptitious tape recordings and notes about confidentialclient

11information, which he disclosed to Schiller. Both made fraudulent representations that they were co-

12authoring a book and that they would submit any manuscript to Simpson to ensure that it contained no

13privileged or confidential information. Both breached their fiduciary duties and confidentiality

14agreements, first by writing a book, and now for Schiller to direct and produce a television miniseries,

15just in production, based almost entirely on improperly obtained information purported to be attorney-

16client privileged communications or confidential defense team discussions.

17A TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from any further actions to participate

18in or transfer rights associated with the miniseries is essential to preserve Simpson’s rights, as the wide

19dissemination of information concerning confidential client conversations and discussions cannot be

20undone. There is no First Amendment prohibition against an injunction to prevent disclosure of

21information obtained in violation of confidentiality agreements or in breach of fiduciary duties. That

22Schiller previously published a book containing information in the miniseries is not a defense to an

23injunction, since the miniseries screenplay contains additional, undisclosed information. Also, courts

24can enjoin a wrongdoer from further and more widespread acts of disclosure.

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26Kardashian was one of Simpson’s lawyers during Simpson’s criminal trial. Schiller, a friend of

27Kardashian, called Kardashian immediately upon learning of the murders, and began encouraging

28Kardashian to surreptitiously take notes and tape record events. Gross Dec. ¶¶ 9(c), 10(c), 14(d), 17(a)

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1& Exs. E, F, J, M. Near the end of the trial, Schiller encouraged Kardashian to represent he was co-

2authoring an “as-told-to” book from Kardashian’s point of view, with Schiller to do the writing.

3Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 2-3.

4At the close of Simpson’s trial, Simpson reminded his attorneys that, due to their fiduciary

5obligations, they could not disclose privileged communications or confidential client information,

6without written authorization. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 5, 19 & Exs. A, F; Dershowitz Dec. ¶¶ 2-4; Scheck

7Dec. ¶¶ 2-4; Neufeld Dec. ¶¶ 2, 3, 7; Chapman Dec. ¶¶ 2-3; Douglas Dec. ¶¶ 2-3; Blasier Dec. ¶¶ 2-3;

8Thompson Dec. ¶¶ 2-3; Bailey Dec. ¶¶ 2, 5; Taft Dec. ¶¶ 3,8.

9Kardashian and Schiller each spoke to Simpson, and stated that they wanted to co-author a

10book from Kardashian’s point of view. They each agreed that they would not include privileged and

11confidential client information in any manuscript unless Simpson gave approval, and would submit any

12manuscript to Simpson prior to publication for review and deletion of such material. Both sent letters

13to Simpson that confirmed they were collaborating on a book. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 7, 9-10, 12-15, 17,

1428-29 & Exs. C-D; Taft Dec. ¶¶ 4-12 & Exs. B-C, E-F; Neufeld Dec. ¶ 8. Schiller admitted that he

15utilized Kardashian to gain access to defense team members. Gross Dec. ¶ 14(e) & Ex. J.

16Schiller insinuated himself into a position of trust and confidence with Simpson, by assisting the

17criminal defense team on a number of matters, such as obtaining clean audio copies of tape recordings

18of interviews with key witness Mark Fuhrman; assisting Simpson during the trial in writing a book, I

19Want to Tell You; convincing Simpson that Schiller should co-author Simpson’s first-person account

20of the trial; signing an agreement concerning this book that he would keep confidential all interviews

21arranged by Simpson, and giving Simpson the right to change or delete any material in the final

22manuscript; and after Simpson’s acquittal, assisting Simpson in producing a video about the case and

23assisted in raising funds. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 8-9, 11 & Ex. B; Douglas Dec. ¶ 9. Schiller since admitted

24that he took these actions for exploitation, to manipulate and ingratiate himself with Simpson and the

25defense team and to gain access, “keeping his eye on the prize.” Gross Dec. ¶¶ 10(b), 11(b), 12, 17(b)-

26(d), 19 & Exs. F-H, M, O.

27In November 1995, Kardashian informed Simpson that his publisher, Random House, to

28approve Kardashian’s book deal, needed a letter from Simpson, and sent a draft letter that would have

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1granted an explicit waiver by Simpson of his privilege as to any communications between Simpson and

2Kardashian. Simpson refused to sign, as he was not willing to waive his privileges. Kardashian

3negotiated with Simpson’s attorneys and finally obtained a letter that did not authorize any waiver that

4he said would be acceptable to his publisher. Thereafter, Kardashian made repeated representations

5that he was writing a book with Schiller and would submit any manuscript for review, and never, until

6the impending publication of the book, stated anything otherwise. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 14-22, 28-29 &

7Exs. D-I; Taft Dec. ¶¶ 5-14 & Exs. B-G; Neufeld Dec. ¶ 8; Douglas Dec. ¶ 4; Scheck Dec. ¶ 6.

8In late 1995 and early 1996, Schiller spoke to Simpson, stating that some lawyerson the defense

9team would not speak to him, and requesting that Simpson give these lawyers permission to speak to

10Schiller. Schiller explicitly represented and agreed that the interviews were for Kardashian’s book, that

11everything the other attorneys would say to him would be protected and not disclosed due to

12Kardashian’s responsibilities as Simpson’s lawyer, that no privileged or confidentialinformation would

13be published unless Simpson gave explicit approval, and that prior to dissemination he and Kardashian

14would submit any manuscript to Simpson for his review. In light of these representations, Simpson

15agreed to give members of his defense team permission to speak to Schiller, and thereafter complied

16with his obligations. Simpson never gave any attorney permission to disclose confidential or privileged

17information to Schiller. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 23-27.

18Schiller admits that he interviewed eight attorneys on Simpson’s defense team, other than

19Kardashian. Gross Dec. ¶ 13(c) & Ex. I. All eight attorneys state that Schiller made agreements with

20them, in exchange for their agreeing to be interviewed, that the interviews were for a book he was co-

21authoring with Kardashian, and that he would submit any manuscript to Simpson for review and

22removal of any privileged or confidential information. Kardashian made similar representations. If

23Kardashian had not been a co-author of the book and if Schiller and Kardashian had not made such

24representations, these attorneys would not have agreed to be interviewed. Dershowitz Dec. ¶¶ 5-9;

25Scheck Dec. ¶¶ 5-11; Chapman Dec. ¶¶ 4, 6; Douglas Dec. ¶¶ 4-10; Blasier Dec. ¶¶ 4-6; Thompson

26Dec. ¶¶ 4-8; Bailey Dec. ¶¶ 6-11; Craig Dec. ¶¶ 3-4.

27In August 1996, when Simpson’s attorney learned that Kardashian’s book was nearing

28completion, he contacted both Kardashian and Schiller to obtain a copy. Both Schiller and Kardashian

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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confirmed to him and Simpson that the manuscript would be submitted to Simpson, and Schiller made arrangements with Simpson’s lawyers to review the manuscript. Neufeld Dec. ¶¶ 9-18 & Exs. B-C; Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 30-31. Shortly thereafter, Schiller stated for the first time that Random House was deciding whether to list Kardashian as an author, and subsequently that he was the sole author of the book. Simpson’s attorney was then informed that Random House refused to allow Schiller to submit the manuscript for review. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 32-33; Neufeld Dec. ¶¶ 11, 12, 19. Simpson’s attorney sent a cease and desist letter to RandomHouse and Schiller’s attorney, informing them that publication of the book would breach fiduciary duties and contracts and was based on fraudulent conduct and would subject them to liability. Neufeld Dec. ¶¶ 20-21 & Exs. D-E.1/

In October 1996, Schiller published a book entitled American Tragedy: The Uncensored Story of the Simpson Defense (the “Book”). Schiller is listed as an author; Kardashian is not. Neither Schiller nor Kardashian submitted a draft of the manuscript of the Book to Simpson for review prior to publication. Neufeld Dec. ¶¶ 22-23; Simpson Dec. ¶ 34; Gross Dec. ¶ 13(a) & Ex. I.

The Book contains a substantial amount of information that Schiller admits is privileged and confidential client information, available only to members of Simpson’s defense team. Gross Dec. ¶¶ 9(b), 10(a), 11(a), 13(b) & Exs. E-G, I. The book jacket describes the Book as: “the untold story . .

.written from deep within the Simpson defense . . . recounted in authentic, often startling detail in the words of Simpson’s confidants, lawyers, special investigators, and expert witnesses . . . in the uncensored words of Simpson’s closest confidants and attorneys.” Schiller concedes, both in the Book and in subsequent interviews, that Kardashian was the source of a large portion of the purported privileged and confidential client information contained in the Book. Neufeld Dec. ¶¶ 24-25 & Ex. G; Gross Dec. ¶¶ 9(e), 10(e), 11(c), 13(b), 14(a) & Exs. E-G, I-J, L. Schiller admitted to several of Simpson’s attorneys that Kardashian provided such information to him. Dershowitz Dec. ¶ 10; Scheck Dec. ¶ 10; Blasier Dec. ¶ 7. Kardashian received compensation for his participation in the Book and promoted it. Gross Dec. ¶¶ 9(d), 14(b), 20 & Exs. E, J, P-Q. Schiller concedes he was writing a book with Kardashian. Gross Dec. ¶¶ 9(a), 14(f) & Exs. E, J.

1/

Whenthe Book was published, Simpson was involved in a civil trial brought by members of the Goldman

 

and Brown families, and due to the financial and time pressures from that trial, was unable to bring a lawsuit to seek an injunction preventing the publication of the Book. Simpson Dec. ¶ 36.

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1The StateBar ofCalifornia determined that Kardashiancommitted professionalmisconduct and

2violated Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e), suspending him for two years, based upon a stipulation by

3Kardashian. Neufeld Dec. ¶ 26 & Ex. H.

4In mid-May 2000, Simpson learned for the first time that Schiller was in the process of making

5a miniseries concerning Simpson’s trial, based on the information that Schiller had obtained while

6writing a book with Kardashian, and that Schiller was producing and directing. Simpson diligently

7acted to retain counsel in this matter and to bring this lawsuit. Simpson Dec. ¶¶ 37, 39.

8The screenplay for the Miniseries contains a substantial amount of information that purports to

9be privileged and confidential client information, i.e., conversations involving only counsel and

10Simpson, conversations involving only defense team members, and comments by counsel on defense

11strategy (approximately 152 pages out of a total of 193 pages). In addition, the Miniseries includes a

12large amount of such information that was not published in the Book (approximately 47 pages out of

13a total of 193 pages). Gross Dec. ¶¶ 6-7 & Ex. D; Sealed Belsky Dec. Ex. A. Last month, Simpson’s

14counsel sent letters to Schiller demanding that he cease and desist from any involvement with the

15Miniseries and requesting a copy of the screenplay for pre-publication review by Simpson. Schiller’s

16counsel responded that Schiller would not do so. Gross Dec. ¶¶ 3-5 & Exs. A-C. The Book was

17published to a limited audience; in contrast, the Miniseries is to be broadcast nationally by CBS

18Television in November, and will be seen by millions of viewers. Gross Dec. ¶¶ 22-23 & Exs. S, T.

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ARGUMENT

20I. A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE

21In determining whether to issue a preliminaryinjunction, a court must weigh two “interrelated”

22factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits at trial; and (2) the relative interim

23harm that the plaintiff will likely suffer if an injunction is not issued compared to the likely interim harm

24to defendant if an injunction is issued. Butt v. State, 4 Cal. 4th 668, 677-78 (1992). “[T]he greater the

25plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” Id. at 678.

26Here, injunctive relief enjoining the dissemination of the Miniseries is essential, because once

27disseminated it will be impossible to undo the disclosures. See Point III, infra.

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II.SIMPSON HAS SHOWN A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.

A.The Miniseries Consists Predominantly of Presumptively Privileged and Confidential Attorney-Client Communications or Defense Team Discussions

It cannot be disputed that the screenplay for the Miniseries is predominantly comprised of scenes that are purported to be conversations between Simpson and his attorneys, discussions between and among attorneys representing Simpson, and Simpson’s attorneys commenting in present time on defense strategy; in fact, these scenes are found on approximately 152 pages out of a total 193 pages in the screenplay. All of these scenes thus involve privileged and confidential client information. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code §§ 952, 954; City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 236-37 (1951). Schiller admitted to members of the defense team that Kardashian was the source of privileged and confidential information, and admitted in interviews that Kardashian was his primary source. He trumpets in the Book and interviews that his sources are Simpson’s attorneys, proclaiming that the Book is based on the “uncensored words of Simpson’s . . . attorneys” and was “written from deep within the Simpson defense . . . in the words of . . . Simpson’s lawyers, special investigators and expert witnesses.” Statement of Facts at 4.2/ Since Simpson has not waived his right to the confidentiality, these discussions are presumptively privileged and confidential. Bus. & Prof. Code

§6068(e); Evid. Code § 917; De Los Santos v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 677, 682 (1980). This type of information would lose its privileged and confidential nature only if defendants had properly and lawfully obtained the information. However, as demonstrated below, Simpson is likely to succeed in establishing that defendants obtained this information improperly and unlawfully by breaching confidentiality agreements and fiduciary duties.

B.Simpson Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of His Claim for Conspiracy to Breach Kardashian’s Fiduciary Duties.

The evidence submitted demonstrates that, from the beginning of Kardashian’s representation, Schiller and he conspired to breach fiduciaryduties. The fiduciaryattorney and client relationship is “of

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Schiller contends that the information in the Book and Miniseries is accurate and factual, Gross Dec.

 

18 & Ex. N, including the information which is purported to be of privileged and confidential communications. Thus, plaintiff need not demonstrate, or even claim, that the information contained in the Miniseries disclosed by his attorney is true and accurate, since an attorney violates his duty of loyalty simply by commenting on information concerning the attorney-client relationship, even if such comments are not true. See Part II.B., infra. In fact, some purported confidential client information is inaccurate. Thompson Dec. ¶ 9.

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1the very highest character.” Lee v. State Bar, 2 Cal.3d 927, 939 (1970). “One of the principal

2obligations which bind an attorney is that of fidelity, the maintaining inviolate the confidence reposed

3in him . . . and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client.” Flatt v. Superior Court,

49 Cal. 4th 275, 289 (1994). See also Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. 3d 742, 750-51 (1979) (the

5fundamental right to counsel “embodies the right to communicate in absolute privacy with one’s

6attorney”); In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 940-41 (1972) (“protection of confidences and secrets is not

7a rule of mere professional conduct, but instead involves public policies of paramount importance”);

8Alkow v. State Bar, 3 Cal. 3d 924, 936 (1971). As the Supreme Court recently reemphasized:

9Attorneys have a duty to maintain undivided loyaltyto their clients to avoid undermining public

confidence in the legal profession and the judicial process. The effective functioning of the

10fiduciary relationship between attorney and client depends on the client’s trust and confidence in counsel. The courts will protect clients’ legitimate expectations of loyalty to preserve this

11essential basis for trust and security in the attorney-client relationship.

12People ex rel. Dept. of Corp. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1146-47 (1999).

13Under California law, an attorneyhas an express statutoryduty, broader than the attorney-client

14privilege, “[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the

15secrets, of his or her client.” Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e); Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 621

16& n.5 (1975). “The attorney’s lips are forever sealed” as to information gained during the attorney-

17client relationship. Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 121 Cal.App.2d 616, 625 (1953).

18Here, there is substantial evidence that Kardashian breached his fiduciary duties to Simpson.

19The State Bar of California recently determined that Kardashian violated Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e).

20Kardashian is the primary source of the information in the Book and Miniseries concerning attorney-

21client conversations and defense team discussions. Kardashian induced other Simpson attorneys to

22provide information to Schiller by representing that he was the co-author of the book and that any

23manuscript would be submitted to Simpson’s attorney for review. Kardashian received compensation

24for his participation in the Book and promoted the Book. See Statement of Facts.

25Schiller and Project 95 are jointly liable for Kardashian’s breaches. A person who “intentionally

26causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability to the principal.”

27Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312 (1958). Numerous California cases have applied this principle.

28Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 353 (1966) (parties who cooperated in another’s breach

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1offiduciaryduties liable for their participation); Pierce v. Lyman, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1104-06 (1991);

2Certified Grocers of Calif., Ltd. v. San Gabriel Valley Bank, 150 Cal. App. 3d 281, 289 (1983);

3Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 307, 314-15 (1979); St. James

4Armenian Church of Los Angeles v. Kurkjian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 547, 552 (1975); Gray v. Sutherland,

5124 Cal. App. 2d 280, 290 (1954); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312, comment c (1958) (“A

6person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his dutyto his principal, receives confidential

7information from the agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it”).

8The evidence is equally clear that Schiller induced, participated in, and reaped the benefit of

9Kardashian’s breach offiduciaryduties. Schiller encouraged Kardashian from the start of Kardashian’s

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representation to surreptitiously take notes and tape record events for use in a book, encouraged

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Kardashian to represent that he was writing a book with Schiller, induced Kardashian to disclose

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privileged and confidential client information to him, and represented to Simpson and Simpson’s

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attorneys that the interviews he was conducting were for a book with Kardashian and that due to

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Kardashian’s fiduciary duties no privileged or confidential could be contained in any publication. The

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Book, and the Miniseries, are based primarily on informationimproperly obtained fromKardashian. See

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Statement of Facts.

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C.

Simpson Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of His Claims for Breaches

 

 

 

of Schiller’s Contracts With Him and With His Attorneys

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Schiller entered into an oral agreement with Simpson, by promising to submit any manuscript

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from his interviews of Simpson’s defense team members to Simpson for pre-publication review and

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removal of any privileged or confidential information, in return for Simpson providing access to

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members of the defense team. Schiller breached this agreement, by refusing to submit the manuscript

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of the Book or the manuscript for the Miniseries to Simpson for pre-publication review. See Statement

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of Facts at 3-5. Any claim by Schiller that no such contract exists is belied by the declaration testimony

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to the contrary of all eight prominent members of the bar who Schiller interviewed.

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Simpson is equally likely to prevail on claim as third party beneficiary for breach of Schiller’s

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contracts with members of defense team. See generally Civ. Code § 1559 (“[a] contract, made

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expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him”); 1 Witkin, Summary of Calif. Law

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(Contracts) § 656, at 595 (9th ed. 1987). Schiller breached oral agreements with all eight of Simpson’s

 

 

 

 

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lawyers he interviewed that he would submit any manuscript concerning the interviews to Simpson for prepublication review and removal of any privileged and confidential information. See Statement of Facts at 3. These agreements clearly were for the benefit of Simpson as a third party beneficiary.

D.Simpson Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of His Claim for Fraud.

As discussed above, the evidence demonstrates that: Schiller and Kardashian made numerous fraudulent representations to Simpson and members of his defense team that they were co-authoring a book, that no privileged and confidential information would be contained in any manuscript without Simpson’s approval, and that any manuscript would be submitted to Simpson for review and deletion of privileged and confidential information; Simpson and members of his defense team relied on these representations and provided access and information to Schiller; these representations were false; and Schiller and Kardashian knew them to be false and made them to induce Simpson and his agents to rely on them. Thus, Simpson is likely to succeed on his claim against defendants for fraud.3/

E.Simpson Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of

His Claim for Breach of Schiller’s Fiduciary Duties.

Schiller also owed a separate fiduciary duty directly to Simpson by reason of their special relationship, which he also breached. “One who voluntarily assumes a position of trust and confidence is a fiduciary, and he remains a fiduciary as long as trust and confidence are reposed in him.” Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 98 (1949); see also Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1139, 1150 (1989); Pryor v. Bistline, 215 Cal. App. 2d 437, 446 (1963). “The very existence of such a relation precludes the party in whom the trust and confidence is reposed fromparticipating in profit or advantage resulting fromthe dealings of the parties to the relation.” Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 708 (1968). The facts demonstrate that Schiller had insinuated himself into a position of trust and confidence with Simpson and should be held to the standard of fiduciary for his betrayal of that confidence. See Statement of Facts at 2-3.

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Simpson’s cause of action for fraud, with a three-year statute of limitations, CCP § 338(d), is not time-

 

barred, since the fraudulent conspiracy continues until the present. An action for civil conspiracy only accrues when the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 786-88 (1979). Defendants are currently taking actions to produceand direct the Miniseries based on information obtained through the above-described fraudulent scheme in order to gain further profits from their fraud, and continue in their refusal to submit the manuscript for the Miniseries to Simpson for review.

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

That Schiller had previously published some of this information in a book does not prevent the entry of

1III. THE RELATIVE INTERIM HARM FAVORS PLAINTIFF.

2In determining the relative interim harm, courtslookat factorsincluding the inadequacyofother

3remedies, the degree of irreparable injury, and the necessity of preserving the status quo. 14859

4Moorpark Homeowner’s Ass’n v. VRT Corp., 63 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1402 (1998). Here, other

5remedies are clearly inadequate, as, without the protection of an injunction, Simpson’s contractual and

6legal right to confidentiality will be extinguished without recourse. See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,

7Fenner & Smith v. Bishop, 839 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Md.1993) (granting TRO to enforce nondisclosure

8agreement, as “no award of money damages will change the fact that information which Plaintiff was

9entitled to have kept from the knowledge of third parties is no longer shielded from their gaze”).

10The resulting harm to Simpson from dissemination of the Miniseries to millions of viewers will

11be irreparable. 152 pages out of 193 pages in the screenplay for the Miniseries contain scenes and

12conversations that are purported to be attorney-client privileged communications, confidential

13information discussed by members of Simpson’s defense team, or attorneys commenting in a manner

14violative of their duties of loyalty. Indeed, the Miniseries is being promoted as showing how Simpson’s

15“lawyers really pushed the envelope – how they plotted, how they manipulated. . . his defense team’s

16true feelings.” Gross Dec. ¶ 22 & Ex. S. Schiller explicitly contends that this is truthful and accurate

17information frommembers of Simpson’s defense team: “written from deep within the Simpson defense

18. . . in the [uncensored] words of Simpson’s . . . lawyers, special investigators, and expert witnesses.”

19Neufeld Dec. ¶ 25 & Ex. G. Schiller therefore cannot deny that the information in the Miniseries is

20purportedly privileged and confidential client information, which, by its very nature, will cause great

21harm from disclosure. See Point II.B, supra.4/ Finally, injunctive relief to prevent the disclosure of

22privileged and confidential information preserves the status quo. See, e.g., Tracer Research Co. v.

23National Env. Serv. Co., 843 F. Supp. 568, 578 (D. Ariz. 1993).

24In contrast to the great and irreparable harm to Simpson, the relative harm to defendants will

25be minimal, as Simpson is willing to expedite the trial in this matter to occur prior to the planned

26November broadcast of the Miniseries. Simpson’s counsel had proposed that defendants agree to

27interim relief that would permit defendants to continue the miniseries production, provided they

28 4/

an injunction prohibiting a more widespread dissemination. See Point IV, infra.

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1retained title and possession of all film recorded so it would be subject to the Court’s ruling on this

2motion. Gross Dec. ¶ 24 & Ex. U. With such relief and a trial prior to broadcast, defendants would

3suffer little harm, as they would not be prevented from completing the production. Defendants, the

4producers of the miniseries, clearly have the ability to retain title and possession of all film recorded.

5If, however, defendants contend that once film is recorded they no longer have title or possession, then

6the necessary relief would be to enjoin defendants from any participation in the Miniseries. The delay

7caused for defendants from such relief would still be much less than the irreparable injury to Simpson.

8IV. SCHILLER’S PRIOR DISCLOSURE OF SOME OF THE INFORMATION IN THE SCREENPLAY IS NOT A DEFENSE.

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Schiller cannot use his prior publication of the Book as a shield to protect him from an

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injunction restraining further disclosures. First, there is a substantial amount of information in the

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Miniseries purported to be privileged and confidentialclient information that was not in the Book (such

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scenes are found on 47 pages out of a total of 193 pages). Gross Dec. ¶ 7 & Ex. D. Thus, the

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Miniseries is the first and only disclosure of this information.

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Second, the prior public disclosure was by Schiller, and not any third party. It is a basic

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principle of equity that: “No one can take advantage of his own wrong.” Civ. Code § 3517. In United

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States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996), the court rejected this exact defense:

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Though information in the public domain would normally not be subject to a restraint

18on disclosure, that principle does not benefit [defendant] for two related reasons. First, he contends that it was his own disclosure that made the information public. Second,

19such self-help does not free him of contractual restraint in circumstances where risks to legitimate interest of the Government might arise from repeated disclosure or from the

20intended or even unintended amplification that is likely to accompany such disclosure.

21Id. at 801-02 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278

22N.W.2d 81, 92-93 (Minn. 1979), a trade secrets case, the court upheld an injunction restraining

23defendantsfromfuture use ofand profit fromconfidentialinformationwrongfully acquired even though

24the information had become generally available subsequent to the wrongful taking, “to ensure that

25plaintiff was reasonably protected against further injury from the wrongful taking and that defendants

26were not unjustly enriched by their prior misconduct.”

27Third, the prior publication of the Book was to a limited audience. In contrast, the intended

28television audience for the Miniseries is millions of people. See Pappas, 94 F.3d at 802 (party who

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publicly disclosed confidential information can be enjoined from repeated disclosure or amplification). Finally, Schiller was put on notice by Simpson in September 1996 that his disclosures were improper and would subject him to legal liability, yet Schiller continued with his improper actions.

Neufeld Dec. ¶20-21 & Exs. D-E.

V.DEFENDANTS HAVE NO FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PROHIBITING FURTHER AND ADDITIONAL DISSEMINATION OF CONFIDENTIAL CLIENT INFORMATION IN BREACH OF CONTRACT AND FIDUCIARY DUTY

The First Amendment is not a defense to a preliminary injunction against publication of

information obtained in breach of a confidentiality agreement or fiduciary duty. Thus, an injunction against defendants’ disclosure of purported confidential client information is not considered an improper prior restraint. For example, in Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to an injunction requiring a CIA agent to submit future writings for prepublication review based on the agent’s breach of fiduciary duty and breach of his promise not to disclose confidentialinformationin a book without submitting the book for prepublicationclearance. The Court also imposed a constructive trust on his profits. See also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (order prohibiting newspaper fromdisclosing informationacquired through pretrial discovery does not violate First Amendment); cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2 (1994) (injunctions not impermissible “prior restraints” if basis for issuance is not content but prior unlawful conduct).5/

Federal courts have consistently recognized that the First Amendment does not bar injunctive relief to remedy breach of contract or breach of trust. Thus, in Maas v. United States, 371 F.2d 348, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court affirmed a preliminary injunction enjoining author Peter Maas from “disseminating or publishing in any form” copies of or excerpts from a manuscript written by Mafioso

5/

As the Supreme Court has explained: “[A] well-established line of decisions hold[s] that generally

 

applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. ... [T]he truthful information sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired.” Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). In Cohen, reporters had promised a confidential news source that they would not reveal his identity. The Court held that the First Amendment does not bar a claim against the news media for breach of such a confidentiality agreement, concluding that “any restrictions that maybe placed on the publication of truthful information are self-imposed,” based on the parties’ agreement, and that “the First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.” Id. at 671, 672.

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1Joseph Valachi and edited by Maas while Valachi was in jail, to preserve the government’s rights under

2an agreement by Maas and Valachi that any manuscript would be submitted to it for review and

3approval prior to publication. See also Pappas, 94 F.3d at 801 (government “is entitled to enforce its

4agreements to maintain the confidentiality of classified information”); Pfeiffer v. CIA, 60 F.3d 861

5(D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting a claim by a former CIA historian that the CIA’s refusal to approve for

6publication a report he had prepared concerning the Bay of Pigs constituted an unconstitutional prior

7restraint and ordering the historian to return the report to the CIA “because he obtained it only by

8violating his fiduciary duty”); Barnstead Broad. Corp. v. Offshore Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 2, 7

9(1994) (“despite the asserted First Amendment implications, [defendant] is equally bound by the terms

10of its contract, voluntarily entered, and maybe enjoined from breaching it”); Agee v. CIA, 500 F. Supp.

11506 (D.D.C. 1980) (issuing an injunction against a CIA agent’s dissemination of CIA-related

12information based on breach of agreement to submit publications for prepublication review).

13California cases are in accord. Thus, in In re Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 3d 14 (1983), the

14defendant filmmaker gained access to a juvenile facilitybased on his agreement to submit any films for

15review and editing prior to dissemination. The court held that the filmmaker’s First Amendment right

16to disseminate his films was limited by his agreement. Id. at 15, 19-22. In Carpenter Found. v. Oakes,

1726 Cal. App. 3d 784 (1972), defendant gained access to historical materials concerning Christian

18Science by virtue of a relationship of confidentiality and trust and his agreement to specific, limited

19distribution of the materials. The court upheld an injunction prohibiting him from publishing the

20materials against a First Amendment challenge. Id. at 792-93. Cf. Marin Indep. Journal v. Municipal

21Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1712 (1993) (seizure of press photos of court proceedings taken in violation

22of court rule not impermissible prior restraint because photos obtained unlawfully); ITT Telecom Prod.

23Corp. v. Dooley, 214 Cal. App. 3d 307 (1989) (statutory privilege for statements made in judicial

24proceedings not applicable to voluntary disclosure of trade secrets in violation of contract).

25In a case involving an attorney’s duties to his client, the court applied these principles to enjoin

26a former member of Jeep’s legal defense team from consulting with plaintiffs in product liability cases

27in which Jeep was a defendant. American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1991).

28The court held that “[d]isclosure of confidential information does not qualify for protection against

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1prior restraint under the First Amendment,” reasoning that “an attorney has no right under the First

2Amendment . . . to disseminate information protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 120. The

3court authorized broad injunctive relief, finding that: “where confidential information is involved, an

4injunction ‘may, in order to do equity, be as broad as reasonably thought necessary’ to avert the harm

5complained of.” Id.; see also id. at 121 (“to protect the attorney-client and work product privilege,

6injunctive relief is appropriate, particularly where, as here, it is demonstrated that the former employee-

7attorney has already violated the privilege and threatens to continue such practice”); Cherne, 278

8N.W.2d at 92 (court “may issue an injunction against a party who has, in violation of an explicit

9agreement or a common law duty, wrongfully used confidential information”); Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d

10559 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (preliminary injunction against book publication that would reveal former

11patient’s confidentialcommunications to psychoanalyst);Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610

12(Mass. 1969) (injunction against commercial showings of documentary film on mental hospital based

13on filmmaker’s failure to comply with contract conditions agreed to in return for permission to film).

14Here, as discussed above, there is substantial evidence that Schiller unlawfully obtained the

15information he wishes to disclose in the Miniseries byinducing Kardashianto breach his fiduciaryduties

16to Simpson, by breaching his own fiduciary duties to Simpson, by violating contracts he made with

17Simpson and with members of Simpson’s defense team, and by fraudulently inducing the cooperation

18of Simpson and members of his defense team. Schiller therefore cannot claim any First Amendment

19right to disseminate this unlawfully obtained information.

20VI. A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER SHOULD BE ENTERED UNTIL PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CAN BE HEARD.

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All of the reasons described in support of a preliminary injunction apply to Simpson’s need for

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a TRO. In addition, because of the limited duration of a TRO, the balance of hardships tips even more

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strongly toward Simpson. Reports in the media suggest that defendants are currently engaged in

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filming the Miniseries, with Schiller and Project 95 actively producing and directing, and that they are

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scheduled to complete filming by the end of August. Gross Dec. ¶ 21 & Ex. R. Schiller’s actions as

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director of the Miniseries mean that he undoubtedly will be further disclosing information that is

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purported to be privileged and confidential client information. Moreover, it is likely that defendants

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will contend that once any scenes are filmed, they no longer have any control over the film. Thus, if

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a TRO does not issue, Simpson will be irreparably harmed as he will be denied any injunctive remedy, since the disclosures of confidential information and the participation by defendants will be complete.

On the other hand, defendants’ burden if a TRO is granted is simply the preservation of the status quo (that is, not disclosing Simpson’s confidences) for the very short time until the preliminary injunctionruling. As the balance of these hardships tips decidedly toward Simpson, a TRO should issue preserving the status quo until a ruling on the preliminary injunction motion.

VII. NO BOND, OR AT MOST A MINIMAL BOND, SHOULD BE REQUIRED

No bond is required to obtain a TRO. City of South S. F. v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Ass’n, 11 Cal. App. 4th 916, 920 (1992); L.A. Local Rule 9.32(e)(1). As the requested TRO would require only that defendants preserve plaintiff’s privileged and confidential information for a few weeks, until a ruling on the preliminary injunction, the Court should exercise its discretion not to require a bond.

The Court also should not require a bond for the preliminary injunction. Although a bond is normally required, CCP § 529, “the court may, in its discretion, waive a provision for a bond . . . if the principal is . . . unable to obtain sufficient sureties.” CCP § 995.240. “[N]o citizen shall be denied an opportunityto commence, prosecute, or defend an actionon account of poverty.” Markley v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 4th 738, 748-49 (1992). Here, Simpson qualifies for the waiver of a bond since, as a judgment debtor for a multi-milliondollar judgment, he cannot obtain sufficient sureties. Simpson Dec. ¶ 38. In the event the Court decides that a bond is required, any bond should be minimal, given the virtual impossibility of Simpson obtaining sureties. Simpson is willing to expedite the trial in this matter, to occur in the next few months prior to any broadcast of the Miniseries, and thus any disruption to defendants would be minimal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court should enter a TRO, issue an order to show cause why

a preliminary injunction should not be entered, and enter a preliminary injunction.

Dated: August 15, 2000

GROSS & BELSKY LLP

 

By:__________________________

 

TERRY GROSS

 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

 

ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON

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PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TRO AND RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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